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Abstract 
Applying an overlapping-generations model with lifetime uncertainty, we examine in this 
paper China’s partially funded public pension system. The findings show that the individual 
contribution rate does not affect the capital-labor ratio but the firm contribution rate does. 
The optimal firm contribution rate depends on the capital share of income, social discount 
factor, survival probability, and population growth rate. The simulation results indicate that 
the optimal firm contribution rate rises with China’s life expectancy but, surprisingly, falls 
with the population growth rate. We demonstrate that the optimal firm contribution rate 
should be cut when the effect of falling population growth rate is greater than that of rising 
life expectancy and that the rate is much more sensitive to the population growth rate than 
to life expectancy. This paper also solves the optimal interval to cope with China’s 
population aging peak in the 2030s. 
Key Words: Public pension, population growth rate, life expectancy 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The Chinese State Council Document 38 of 2005 – “Decision on Improving the Basic 
Pension System for Enterprise Employees” – introduced a new urban public pension 
program in China. Under the program, the government establishes an individual account for 
each employee plus a social pool for all employees and retirees. Each firm contributes 20% 
of its payroll to the social pool, while each employee contributes 8% of her wage to the 
individual account. The social pool fund employs a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system 
to cover the benefits of current retirees.1 The accumulation in the individual account is used 
to cover the financial need of the individual participant at retirement. Each retiree thus 
receives pension benefits from her individual account and PAYG pension benefits from the 
social pool. 
In China, population aging is very rapid because of rising longevity and falling population 
growth rate. It is expected that the population aging peak will appear in the 2030s. What 
                                                     
+ Zaigui Yang (yangzaigui@hotmail.com) is with the School of Insurance, Central University 
of Finance and Economics in Beijing, China. The author is grateful to three anonymous 
referees of the journal for helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining omissions or 
errors are the author’s responsibility. Financial support from the Social Science Foundation 
of the Ministry of Education of China (No. 06JA630079) is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 For the sake of simplicity, the author uses only “she” and its variations in this paper. 
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policies should the Chinese government adopt to deal with the pension, rising longevity and 
population aging issues? 
We find literature on the relationship between lifetime uncertainty, population growth rate 
and public pension. Yaarri (1965) pioneers studies on consumer allocation over time 
concentrating on the lifetime uncertainty and ignoring the other uncertainties by a 
continuous time model. Some of the literature on public pension with lifetime uncertainty 
studies PAYG pension systems (e.g., Pecchenino and Utendorf, 1999; Fuster, 2000; Zhang 
and Zhang, 2001; and Pecchenino and Pollard, 2002). Several studies analyze fully funded 
pension (e.g., Abel, 1987; and Karni and Zilcha, 1989). Some of the literature examine both 
PAYG and fully funded pensions (e.g., Sheshinski and Weiss, 1981; Pecchenino and 
Pollard, 1997; and Zhang et al., 2001). However, no papers in the literature on public 
pension with lifetime uncertainty are known to have examined a partially funded public 
pension system. Hence, this paper investigates this issue using China as a case. 
In the literature mentioned above, pensions are financed only by wage taxes. However, in 
most of the countries that have public pension systems, the government levies pension 
taxes on each employee’s wage and on each enterprise’s payroll using a proportional 
taxation schedule. So does the Chinese government. 
As a means to generate an overlapping-generations model with lifetime uncertainty, we 
examine China’s partially funded public pension combining social pool and individual 
accounts. By doing so, we attempt to find optimal pension contribution rates.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model in market 
economy. Section 3 derives the formula to compute the optimal contribution rate. Section 4 
simulates three cases. Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
II. The Model 
This model extends those of Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) and Pecchenino and Pollard 
(2002) by considering a partially funded public pension financed by individual contributions 
and firm contributions. We define that a closed economy is composed of numerous 
individuals and firms and a government. The generation born at the beginning of period t is 
called generation t. The population grows at the rate of 11 −= −tt NNn , where Nt is the 
population size of generation t. 
Individuals. Each individual survives to the end of her working period certainly. The 
person’s survival probability in the retirement period is [ ]1,0∈p . In the working period, each 
individual earns wage by supplying inelastically one unit of labor and makes pension 
contributions. It is possible for the worker to inherit some unintentional bequests from her 
parent with probability ( )p−1 . The worker consumes part of income and saves the rest. If 
she outsurvives the working period, then the retiree consumes her savings with accrued 
interest, funded pension benefits and PAYG pension benefits. If the person dies at the 
beginning of the retirement period, then her savings with accrued interest and funded 
pension benefits are inherited equally by the surviving children as unintentional bequests. 
Each individual derives utility from her working-period consumption tc1  and possible 
retirement-period consumption 12 +tc . The utility is described by an additively separable 
logarithmic function. Thus, each individual solves the following maximization problem: 
 { } 121,, lnlnmax 121 ++=+ tttscc cpcUttt , (1) 
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 s.t. ( ) ( ) tttt swbpc −−+−= τ111 , (2) 
 11112 )1( ++++ +++= ttttt PFsrc , (3) 
 111 )1()1( +++ ++=+ tttt Fsrbn , (4) 
where tw  is the wage, τ  the individual contribution rate, ts  the savings, and 1+tr  the 
interest rate, 1+tF  the funded pension benefits, where ( ) ttt IrF 11 1 ++ += , tI  the individual 
account principal per worker, 1+tP  the PAYG pension benefits, and 1+tb  the bequests 
inherited by each children. The relation between tI  and τ  is explained in below in this 
section. 
Substituting equations (2)-(4) into equation (1) and differentiating it with respect to ts  yields 
the first-order condition: 
 ( ) 12111 ++ =+ ttt ccrp . (5) 
This familiar expression implies that the utility loss from reducing one unit of working-period 
consumption is equal to the utility gain from increasing ( )11 ++ tr  units of possible retirement-
period consumption with probability p. 
Firms. Firms produce a single commodity in competitive markets. The production is 
described by a Cobb-Douglas function αα −= 1ttt NAKY  or αtt Aky = , where tY  is the output 
in period t, A the productivity, tK  the capital stock, α the capital share of income, 
ttt NKk =  the capital-labor ratio, and ty  the output-labor ratio. 
Firms make pension contributions at the rate of ( )1,0∈η  on their payroll. According to the 
product distribution, one can get ( ) tttttt NwKrNAK ηαα ++=− 11 . Firms act competitively, 
renting capital to the point where the marginal product of capital is equal to its rental rate, 
and hiring labor to the point where the marginal product of labor is equal to ( ) twη+1 : 
 1−= αα tt Akr , (6) 
 
( )
η
α α
+
−=
1
1 t
t
Ak
w . (7) 
The Government. The accumulation in the individual account is used to pay the individual 
when she retires in the next period. The pension benefit is funded as ( ) 111 ++ =+ ttt Fwr τ  or: 
 tt wI τ= , (8) 
The social pool fund is paid to the retirees in the current period and offers PAYG pension 
benefits of tttt wNPpN η=−1  or: 
 tt wp
nP η+= 1 . (9) 
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Equilibrium. Let us assume that the savings and the individual account principal of the 
young in period t generate the capital stock in period t+1: 
 ( ) 11 ++=+ ttt knIs . (10) 
A competitive equilibrium for this market economy is a sequence as 
{ }∞=+++ 011121 ,,,,,,,, tttttttttt kbPIrwscc  that satisfies equations (1)-(10) for all t, given the 
initial condition 0k  and the values of parameters τ and η. 
Substituting equations (2)-(4) and (6)-(10) into equation (5) gives a dynamic system: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) αα
ααα
η
αηα
αη
αα
1
1
11
1
1
1
1
1
1111
111
1
11
+−++
−+−+
+
−++++=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−++−+
−+
ttt
ttttt
Ak
p
nAkkn
AkkpknAkAkp
. (11) 
Assume that there exists a unique, stable and nonoscillatory equilibrium. The stability 
condition of this system is shown in Appendix A. 
The individual contribution rate does not exist in equation (11). It implies that the individual 
contribution rate has no effect on the capital-labor ratio. This is because that the mandatory 
savings (individual contributions) crowd out private savings by one-for-one, which is 
reflected by equation (10). 
 
III. Social Equilibrium 
The optimal firm contribution rate can be defined by comparing a decentralized equilibrium 
with the social optimum. The social welfare function in this paper is defined as the sum of 
the weighted utilities of all current and future generations:2 
 ( )∑∞
= +
++=
0
12120 lnlnln
i
ii
i cpccpW ρ . (12) 
where ρ  is the social discount factor, which reflects the preference of the social planner. It 
indicates how much the social planner weights the utilities of different generations in his or 
her social welfare calculations. It is assumed to be in the interval of (0, 1); that is, the social 
planner cares less about future generations.3 
The resource constraint is: 
                                                     
2 Samuelson (1968), Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Groezen et al. (2003) also use 
analogous social welfare functions. 
3 ( )1,0∈ρ  implies that the social planner gives diminishing weights on the utilities of future 
generations, i.e., weight 1 on the utilities of generation 0 and surviving generation -1, weight 
ρ  on the utility of generation 1, weight 2ρ  on the utility of generation 2, etc. 
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 ( )
n
pc
cknAkk iii
α
ii ++++=+ + 11
2
11 , (13) 
for given 0k . The social planner maximizes the social welfare subject to the resource 
constraint and the initial condition. Thus, the first-order conditions for the social welfare 
maximization problem are (also refer to Appendix B): 
 ∗∗ =+ 21)1( ccn ρ , (14) 
 ( ) ρα nkαA +=+ −∗ 11 1 , or 1
1
1 −∗ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= α
ραA
nk ρ , (15) 
where the superscript (*) denotes the optimal steady state values of variables. When the 
capital-labor ratio satisfies equation (15), the ratio is optimal and the social welfare reaches 
the optimal level. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++−+−−−+−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++−+−+−+−
=∗
npnppn
p
npnppnp
1111111
111111
ρρα
α
ρρα
α
ρη . (16) 
Equation (16) is the formula to compute the optimal firm contribution rate. The active factors 
in the formula are the survival probability in retirement period, social discount factor, capital 
share of income, and population growth rate. Partially differentiating ∗η  with respect to p 
and n, respectively, gives that the effects of life expectancy and population growth rate on 
the optimal firm contribution rate are ambiguous. We check the effects of it using 
simulations. 
 
IV. Simulations 
In this section, we simulate the effects of life expectancy and population growth rate on the 
optimal firm contribution rate so that we can find the optimal firm contribution rate. The 
simulations is performed in two steps: The first step is to estimate the baseline parameter 
values. The second step is to simulate three cases: (1) rising life expectancy; (2) falling 
population growth rate; and (3) rising life expectancy and falling population growth rate. 
Estimation of Parameter Values. We estimate the baseline parameter values in this 
subsection. The capital share of income, α, is usually to be estimated as 0.3 in developed 
countries (e.g., Zhang et al., 2001; Pecchenino and Pollard, 2002; and Barro and Sala-I-
Martin, 2004). The labor in China is comparatively cheaper, and thus the labor share of 
income is lower, while the capital share of income is higher than that in developed countries. 
Hence, we assume that α in China could be 0.35. 
There are several calibers for population statistics in China. Because the public pension 
system in urban area is different from that in rural area and because only the former is 
examined in this paper, we select the caliber of “Urban Population.” The population growth 
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rate in the period from 1978 to 2004 is computed at n =2.148 based on the data in China 
Statistical Yearbook – 2005.4 
The survival probability in retirement period is estimated by life expectancy. By virtue of the 
China Statistical Yearbook, life expectancy in 2000 is 71.40 years old. The survival life-span 
in retirement period is 19.4 (or 71.40 – 26 × 2) years. (One period includes 26 years. Even if 
childhood period is omitted in the model, it must be taken into account when we practically 
compute the survival life-span in retirement period). Hence, the survival probability is 
p=19.4/26=74.615%. This computation approach is equivalent to:5 
 4.71326226)1( =××+××− pp . 
The social discount factor reflects the preference of the social planner. It indicates how 
much the government weights different generations in its social welfare calculations. It 
should thus be estimated in compliance with government regulations. Based on the Chinese 
State Council Document 38 of 2005, one can get that the optimal firm contribution rate 
decided by the government is 20%. Substituting the above parameter values into equation 
(16) and calculating repeatedly until the difference between the two sides becomes 0, one 
can get that ρ=0.547. 
The Optimal Firm Contribution Rate. In this subsection, we examine the effects of life 
expectancy and population growth rate on the optimal firm contribution rate by simulating 
the mentioned three cases. The white paper, “China’s Social Security and Its Policies” 
(Information Office of China's State Council, 2004), points out that “China is now an aging 
society. As the aging of the population quickens, the number of elderly people is becoming 
very large. This trend will reach its peak in the 2030s.” Our simulation is based on this 
anticipation. In the simulations, the values of α and ρ are constant. 
Case 1 (Rising Life Expectancy). According to the UN (2003), the life expectancy in China 
during 2030-2035 will be 74.7 years old. Simulating by substituting the values into the 
formula to compute the survival probability 7.74326226)1( =××+××− pp  gives: 
 p=(74.7-26×2)/26=87.308%. 
In the computation, life expectancy is assumed to start and remain at the level of 74.7 years 
old. Simulating by substituting 1+n=3.148 and p=87.308% into equation (16) yields that ∗η = 
22.65 %. 
The UN (2003) also forecasts that the life expectancy in China during 2035-2040 will be 
75.5 years old. Simulating analogously gives that ∗η = 22.90 %. In the simulation, life 
expectancy is assumed to start and remain at the level of 75.5 years old. The simulation 
results are shown in Table 1. It is shown that the rise in life expectancy induces the increase 
in the optimal firm contribution rate. 
 
                                                     
4 There are two reasons to choose a period length of 26 years in this model. One is that the 
length is usually in the interval of 25-30 years in the literature on OLG model. The other is 
the structure of the data in China. 
5 Although the choice of period length is arbitrary, it has to obey the following rule: Three 
times of the period length should be longer than or equal to life expectancy to ensure p ≤1. 
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Table 1: The Effect of Life Expectancy on ∗η  
Year Life Expectancy p 1+n ∗η  
2030-2035 74.7 87.308% 22.65% 
2035-2040 75.5 90.385% 
3.148 
22.90% 
 
Table 2: The Effect of Population Growth Rate on ∗η  
The Line Decided by 1+n p ∗η  
(1996, 1.0606) and (2040, 1) 2.207 15.39% 
(2004, 1.0364) and (2040, 1) 1.794 
74.615% 
11.47 % 
 
Table 3: The Effects of Life Expectancy and Population Growth Rate on ∗η  
Life Expectancy p 1+n ∗η  
2.207 17.03% 
74.7 87.31% 
1.794 12.31% 
2.207 17.05% 
75.5 90.38% 
1.794 12.16% 
 
 
 
Case 2 (Falling Population Growth Rate). The China Population Society and China Family 
Planning Association (2005) announced that “China will realize the zero growth of 
population by the year of 2040.” For simplification, it is assumed that the urban population 
growth rate will also become zero in 2040. We estimate the value of (1+n) in period 2005-
2030 by a line decided by two points. One of the points is (2040, 1). The other point can be 
found in China Statistical Yearbook – 2005.  
Let jl  denote the population growth rate in year j, and then the values of ( )jl+1  from 1990 
to 2004 are computed as shown in Appendix C. The maximum is ( )19961 l+ , which is equal 
to 1.0606. The value of ( )20041 l+  is equal to 1.0364. 
The two points, (1996, 1.0606) and (2040, 1), decide the following line: 
  ( ) ( )1996
44
0606.00606.11 −⋅−=+ jl j . (17) 
Using Line (17), we predict the values of ( )jl+1  from 2005 to 2030 (refer to Appendix C). 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance (2008), Volume 2, Issue 2 
26 
The product of ( )jl+1  from 2005 to 2030 is the value of (1+n) in period 2005-2030, which is 
equal to 2.207. Simulating by substituting 1+n=2.207 and p=74.615% into equation (16) 
yields ∗η =15.39 %, which is shown in Table 2. 
Similarly, the two points, (2004, 1. 0364) and (2040, 1), decide the following line: 
  ( ) ( )2004
36
0364.00364.11 −⋅−=+ jl j . (18) 
Simulating analogously gives that the value of (1+n) in period 2005-2030 is 1.794, 
furthermore, the optimal firm contribution rate is ∗η =11.47 % (shown in Table 2). 
The simulation shows that the fall in the population growth rate leads to a decrease in the 
optimal firm contribution rate. It can be explained as follows. The fall in the population 
growth rate has two opposite effects: the first is to decrease the social pool benefits directly; 
and the second is to increase the wage indirectly. When the direct effect dominates the 
indirect one, the social pool benefits will fall with the population growth rate. Because the 
firm contribution rate has a positive relation with the social pool benefits, the optimal firm 
contribution rate is decreasing in the population growth rate. 
Case 3 (Rising Life Expectancy and Falling Population Growth Rate). Using the forecasted 
life expectancy, 74.7 or 75.5 years old, and the predicted (1+n) in period 2005-2030, 2.207 
or 1.794, we get four combinations shown in Table 3. Simulating by substituting the 
combinations of values into equation (16) gives the optimal firm contribution rate under each 
combination. It is shown that the optimal firm contribution rate should be cut when the effect 
of falling population growth rate dominates that of rising life expectancy. 
Tables 1-3 show that the optimal firm contribution rate is much more sensitive to the 
population growth rate than to life expectancy. In Table 3, for example, if (1+n) is 2.207, the 
change in the optimal firm contribution rate is only from 17.03% to 17.05% as life 
expectancy rises from 74.7 to 75.5 years old. However, if life expectancy is 74.7 years old, 
the optimal firm contribution rate changes from 17.03% to 12.31% when (1+n) falls from 
2.207 to 1.794. 
If life expectancy rises to 74.7-75.5 years old in the 2030s as forecasted by the UN (2003) 
and the population growth rate falls to zero by the year of 2040 as anticipated by the China 
Population Society and China Family Planning Association (2005), then the optimal firm 
contribution rate should be cut from 20% to the interval of (12.16%, 17.05%). This is the 
optimal interval of firm contribution rate to cope with the population aging peak in China in 
the 2030s. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Applying the overlapping-generations model with lifetime uncertainty, we have examined 
China’s partially funded public pension program that combines a social pool with individual 
accounts to seek the optimal individual and firm contribution rates. It is shown that the 
individual contribution rate does not affect the capital-labor ratio, but the firm contribution 
rate does. The optimal firm contribution rate depends on the capital share of income, social 
discount factor, survival probability, and population growth rate. 
Using the data in China Statistical Yearbook – 2005 and World Population Prospects and 
the anticipation of China Population Society and China Family Planning Association, we 
Population Growth Rate, Life Expectancy and Pension Program 
27 
simulate cases in which life expectancy is rising and/or the population growth rate is falling, 
especially the case in the 2030s when the share of elderly people in China reaches its peak. 
The simulation gives the following results. First, the optimal firm contribution rate rises with 
life expectancy. Second, surprisingly, the optimal firm contribution rate falls with the 
population growth rate. Third, when the effect of falling population growth rate dominates 
that of rising life expectancy, the optimal firm contribution rate should be cut. Fourth, the 
optimal firm contribution rate is much more sensitive to the population growth rate than to 
life expectancy. Finally, if life expectancy rises to 74.7-75.5 years old in the 2030s and the 
population growth rate falls to zero by the year of 2040, then the optimal firm contribution 
rate should be in the interval of (12.16%, 17.05%), which is the optimal interval to cope with 
China’s population aging peak in the 2030s. 
Having knowledge about the optimal interval of firm contribution rate is helpful for the 
government and private entities to design their public and private pension programs, 
respectively. For example, the firm contribution rate has been so high in China that there 
has been widespread evasion of firms’ pension contributions. The social insurance in China 
comprise public pension, medical, unemployment, work-related injury, and maternity 
insurance. The firm contribution rates for these five lines of insurance are 20%, 6%, 2%, 
1%, and 1%, respectively. Thus, the social insurance contribution rate burdened by 
enterprise is 30% of payroll. In addition to the social insurance, the enterprises have to 
participate in a housing security, where the firm contribution rate is about 10%. 
Consequently, a firm’s total contribution rate can reach or even exceed 40%. If the 
enterprises reported and made contributions strictly based on reality, many of them would 
go bankrupt. Given the potentially high contribution rate, particularly for pension 
contribution, some companies may attempt to refuse to participate or, more commonly, 
understate their number of employees and payroll. 
If the firm contribution rate can be cut from 20% to the interval of (12.16%, 17.05%), 
numerous companies can lighten their heavy pension burden and market will observe fewer 
market conduct cases. More importantly, China’s public pension program will become 
financially healthier. 
There are some shortcomings and limitations in the model. Altruism in real life is not taken 
into account. The survival probability is assumed and estimated simply. The arbitrariness in 
the choice of period length is also a limitation of the model. The estimations for the capital 
share of income and population growth rate are simplified as well. The above simplifications 
in the model might lead to a significant deviation from reality. For further research, any 
extension to counteract any one of the above shortcomings would be valuable. 
 
Appendix A 
The assumption that there is a unique, stable and nonoscillatory steady state equilibrium is 
equivalent to ( )1,01 ∈+ tt dkdk  around the steady state (k). In order to find the stability 
condition, we differentiate equation (11) with respect to 1+tk  and tk . Evaluating the 
derivatives around the steady state gives: 
 01 =++ tt jdkidk , (A1) 
where: 
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( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ +−++−+−−+
+++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛
+
−+++=
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, 
 ( ) ( )( ) 011
1
11 1211 <⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−++
−+−= −−− ααα ααη
αα AkpAkAkpj . 
Therefore, the stability condition is 10 1 <−=< +
i
j
dk
dk
t
t , or: 
 0>+ ji . (A2) 
 
Appendix B 
The Lagrange function for the social welfare maximization problem is: 
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where tλ  is the Lagrange multiplier for the resource constraint in period t. Differentiating L 
with respect to tc1 , tc2  and 1+tk  gives: 
 01 =− ttt c λρ , (A3) 
 ( ) 0121 =+−− npcp ttt λρ , (A4) 
 ( ) ( ) 011 111 =+++− −++ αttt αAkλnλ . (A5) 
Arranging equations (A3) through (A5) at the optimal steady state ( ∗∗∗ 21 ,, cck ) yields 
equations (14) and (15). 
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Appendix C 
Table A-1: Computed ( )jl+1  
From 1990 to 2004 
Table A-2: Predicted ( )jl+1  
From 2005 to 2030 
Year 
j 
( )jl+1   
Predicted by  
Line (17) 
( )jl+1   
Predicted by  
Line (18) 
Year 
j 
Urban 
Population 
(10,000 persons) 
( )jl+1  
2005 1.048 1.035 
1978 17,245  2006 1.047 1.034 
1980 19,140  2007 1.045 1.033 
1985 25,094  2008 1.044 1.032 
1989 29,540  2009 1.043 1.031 
1990 30,195 1.0222 2010 1.041 1.030 
1991 31,203 1.0334 2011 1.040 1.029 
1992 32,175 1.0312 2012 1.039 1.028 
1993 33,173 1.0310 2013 1.037 1.027 
1994 34,169 1.0300 2014 1.036 1.026 
1995 35,174 1.0294 2015 1.034 1.025 
1996 37,304 1.0606 2016 1.033 1.024 
1997 39,449 1.0575 2017 1.032 1.023 
1998 41,608 1.0547 2018 1.030 1.022 
1999 43,748 1.0514 2019 1.029 1.021 
2000 45,906 1.0493 2020 1.028 1.020 
2001 48,064 1.0470 2021 1.026 1.019 
2002 50,212 1.0447 2022 1.025 1.018 
2003 52,376 1.0431 2023 1.023 1.017 
2004 54,283 1.0364 2024 1.022 1.016 
2025 1.021 1.015 
2026 1.019 1.014 
2027 1.018 1.013 
2028 1.017 1.012 
2029 1.015 1.011 
Columns 1 and 2 are cited from China 
Statistical Yearbook – 2005. Column 3 is 
computed based on Column 2 data. 
 
2030 1.014 1.010 
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